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a b s t r a c t 
A burgeoning literature in economics has started examining the role of social norms in 
explaining economic behavior. Surprisingly, the vast majority of this literature has studied 
social norms in asocial decision settings, where individuals are observed to act in isolation 
from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment ( N = 850) 
to show that “peers” can have a profound inﬂuence on individuals’ perceptions of norms 
of fair sharing, which we elicit in an incentive compatible way. However, in contrast to 
these strong peer effects in social norms of fair sharing, we ﬁnd limited evidence of the 
inﬂuence of norms and peers on actual sharing behavior. We discuss how these results can 
be explained by heterogeneity in normative views as well as in willingness to comply with 
norms. 
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 1. Introduction 
We study the driving forces underlying one of the fundamental principles of human social behavior: fair sharing. While
earlier explanations have focused on the role of other-regarding preferences and preferences for equality (see, e.g., Camerer,
2003 , Chap. 2), we investigate a more recent account of fair sharing that relies on the concept of norm compliance : many
people have an intrinsic preference to conform to what is collectively perceived as “socially appropriate” and are willing to
sacriﬁce material gain in order to comply with such norms. 1 In fact, social norms are thought to drive behavior in a variety
of social contexts (e.g., Elster, 1989; Bicchieri, 20 06; López-Pérez, 20 08; Krupka and Weber, 2013 ). A number of recent
experimental studies use a norm compliance framework to explain behavior across several settings, including dictator games∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk (S. Gächter), leonie.gerhards@wiso.uni-hamburg.de (L. Gerhards), daniele.nosenzo@nottingham.ac.uk 
(D. Nosenzo). 
1 Another class of explanations for fair sharing and giving focuses on the role of self- or social-image concerns whereby individuals care about being 
perceived as fair (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2011; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017 ). In our view this approach is 
complementary to the social norms approach in the sense that theories of image concerns often assume the existence of a norm of acceptable behavior 
(e.g. equal sharing) that individuals strive to adhere to in order to boost their image. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.06.001 
0014-2921/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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 ( Krupka and Weber, 2013; Krupka et al., 2017; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016 ), third-party allocator games ( Barr et al.,
2015 ), gift-exchange games ( Gächter et al., 2013 ), oligopoly games ( Krupka et al., 2017 ), public good, trust and ultimatum
games ( Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016 ). 
However, nearly all of these studies of social norms focus on tightly controlled, but surprisingly asocial decision environ-
ments, where individuals face neutral and abstract decision situations, under full anonymity, and in complete isolation from
other decision-makers. While the use of contextually sterile decision environments is one of the hallmarks of experimental
control, we also notice that contextual variables – from the framing of the decision task to the presence and behavior of
other decision-makers in the decision setting – play a crucial role in nearly every conceptual account of social norms. Min-
imal variations in the context can profoundly change individuals’ perception of the nature of the decision situation and the
underlying norms of conduct ( Bicchieri, 2006 ). This highlights the importance of studying the interaction between contex-
tual variables and norm compliance. In this paper we take a step in this direction by systematically studying the inﬂuence
on norm compliance in fair sharing of one speciﬁc contextual variable: the presence of “peers”, i.e. other decision-makers,
in the decision setting faced by an individual. 
We believe that understanding the inﬂuence of peers on individual decision-making is important for a number of reasons.
First, information about peer behavior is typically available in many natural social settings, where individuals do not act
in social isolation. On the contrary, people often have the opportunity to interact with others and observe their choices
before making a decision. Thus, studying the inﬂuence of peers on individual decision-making is inherently relevant for
understanding the general dynamics of human social interactions. 
Second, the study of peer inﬂuence is of theoretical interest because peers are an important determinant of norm-driven
behavior in most conceptual accounts of norm compliance across the social sciences. For instance, in economics, Sugden
(1998) argues that observing instances of norm-compliance or norm-breaking can reinforce or weaken the expectations
that the norm ought to be followed. In social psychology, Cialdini et al. (1990) contend that the behavior of peers exerts
normative inﬂuence on individual behavior by shaping what individuals perceive as typical or normal behavior in a given
situation (the “descriptive norm”). In philosophy, Bicchieri (2006) proposes that whether or not a norm will be followed
depends partly on “normative expectations” (whether the individual expects that suﬃciently many others expect him or her
to comply), and partly on “empirical expectations” (whether the individual expects that suﬃciently many others will com-
ply). Sociologists Lindenberg and Steg (2013) argue that the behavior of others can shift the weights that individuals place
on the normative-goal (following social norms) relative to the more self-centered hedonic and gain goals (need satisfaction
and resource accumulation). 
Despite the large theoretical literature on the importance of peers for norm-driven behavior, the empirical evidence
is scant. In many of the settings where peer effects have been documented empirically (e.g., Keizer et al., 2008; Shang
and Croson, 2009; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Krupka and Weber, 2009; Gächter et al., 2012; Falk et al., 2013; Thöni and
Gächter, 2015 ), other behavioral forces may explain the correlations between individuals’ and peers’ actions observed in the
experiments. 2 Even in settings where the observed data patterns are diﬃcult to reconcile with alternative explanations (e.g.
McDonald et al., 2013 ) and results are strongly suggestive that the presence of peers affects norms, the lack of direct data
on how peers affect normative considerations makes it diﬃcult to identify whether the observed impact of peers’ actions
on behavior is mediated by corresponding shifts in the normative evaluation of actions. 
In this paper we present a new set of dictator game experiments that measure the inﬂuence of peers on both actual
sharing and norms of sharing using the incentive-compatible norm-elicitation task by Krupka and Weber (2013) . 3 Our ex-
periments set us apart from the existing literature on peer effects mentioned above, in that we are able to explicitly identify
the linkages between peers’ actions, normative views, and individual sharing behavior. In this aspect our paper is related to
Gächter et al. (2013) , who, however, study peer effects in norms and behavior in a gift exchange game. They ﬁnd that peer
effects in norms do not explain the observed peer effects in actual gift exchange. While these results cast some doubt on
the importance of norms for peer effects, it would be premature to base judgment on the importance of norm following
solely on the study of one speciﬁc decision setting and one speciﬁc social norm. It is indeed unclear whether the results
from the gift exchange game may also extend to other settings and norms, as it may be the case that the inﬂuence of peer
behavior is more decisive for norms of fair sharing than for reciprocal gift exchange. 
Moreover, all the experiments reported in Gächter et al. (2013) are based on gift exchange games where the decision-
makers observe the decisions of a peer before making their own choices. In this sense, it is not obvious that their experi-
ments allow assessing the causal impact that the presence of peers may have on norms and behavior, because their study
lacks a treatment without peers. In this paper, we study settings where the decision-maker is exposed to the inﬂuence
of a peer as well as settings where the decision-maker acts in isolation from peers. This allows us to examine the causal
inﬂuence that peers have on norms and behavior. 
Speciﬁcally, in our Peer treatment subjects play a sequential three-person dictator game, where two dictators can transfer
money to one recipient. The dictators move sequentially and thus the second dictator can observe the transfer made by the
ﬁrst dictator (the “peer”) before making her own transfer decision. In contrast, our NoPeer treatment is based on a two-2 For example, in some settings peer effects can arise if individuals are motivated by a desire to equalize material earnings between themselves and their 
peers. See Thöni and Gächter (2015) for a discussion of the possible behavioral mechanisms underlying peer effects. 
3 As we explain more in detail in Section 3 , in the Krupka and Weber (2013) task, participants in an experiment read the description of a scenario and 
are asked to evaluate the social appropriateness of each action available to the decision-maker in the scenario. 
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 person dictator game where there is no peer and her role is replaced with Nature: in this game, Nature moves ﬁrst and
randomly determines an endowment for the recipient; the dictator observes this endowment and then transfers money to
the recipient. The crucial difference between the two treatments is thus that, while in the Peer treatment the recipient’s
wealth (prior to the dictator’s transfer) is determined by a peer, in the NoPeer treatment it is determined by chance and
there is no decision-maker other than the dictator present in the decision context. 
Furthermore, to systematically investigate the extent to which the inﬂuence of peers on normative considerations and
behavior depends on the nature of the underlying norms, our study examines two payoff-equivalent, but differently framed,
versions of the dictator game. In one version the dictator can give money to another player, while in the other version the
dictator can also take money from the other player. Krupka and Weber (2013) have used similar versions of the dictator
game to measure the inﬂuence of norms on dictator’s behavior. 4 They have shown that these “give” and “take” versions of
the dictator game produce stark differences in the amounts of money that dictators share with recipients. Moreover, they
explain these differences by the fact that the norm that governs behavior in the “give” version of the game is substantially
different from the norm that applies to the “take” game. Hence, we use give/take framing to study the extent to which the
inﬂuence of peers depends on the nature of the norm (norm of giving vs. norm of taking). 
To summarize, our study is based on four treatments, using a 2 × 2 factorial design where we vary the frame of the
game ( Give vs. Take ) and whether a peer is present or absent ( Peer vs. NoPeer ). For each treatment, we conduct two types
of experiments, a norm-elicitation experiment and a behavioral experiment. In the norm-elicitation experiment, we follow
Krupka and Weber (2013) and measure in an incentive compatible way the extent to which the peer’s behavior affects the
perception of what constitutes socially appropriate behavior. In the behavioral experiment, we check how these variations in
perceptions of social appropriateness translate into actual decisions. A total of 850 subjects participated in our experiments.
Our norm-elicitation experiments reveal that the presence of peers has a systematic and strong inﬂuence on the per-
ceptions of social appropriateness. In the Peer treatment, ungenerous monetary transfers to the recipient are viewed as
relatively more appropriate when the peer is also ungenerous towards the recipient. However, when the same levels of
recipient’s wealth have been determined by chance ( NoPeer treatment), the relation between recipient’s wealth and appro-
priateness is reversed : ungenerous transfers are viewed as relatively more appropriate when the recipient is wealthier (i.e.
when the recipient has randomly received a larger endowment). Interestingly, we also ﬁnd that the strength of these effects
varies considerably across our two versions of the dictator game. The norm that governs behavior in the Take game is much
more stable and resilient to peer inﬂuence than the norm in the Give game. 
Based on the results of the norm-elicitation experiment, we should expect to observe systematic differences in the in-
ﬂuence of peers’ actions (and hence recipient’s wealth) on dictator’s actual behavior across our experimental conditions.
In particular, we should expect a positive relation between dictator transfers and recipient wealth in the Peer treatment,
while a negative relation should emerge in the NoPeer treatment. Moreover, these treatment differences should be more
pronounced in the Give than in the Take game. 
The results of our behavioral experiments are only partially in line with these expectations. While we observe that
dictators in the NoPeer treatment signiﬁcantly reduce their transfers when the recipient possesses larger endowments,
there is, on average, no relation between dictator and peer transfers in the Peer treatment. Moreover, we do not detect any
differences in the magnitude of these effects between the Give and Take conditions. 
The absence of a peer effect in the Peer treatment is consistent with the ﬁndings reported by Panchanathan et al. (2013) .
They also conduct a three-person dictator game experiment where two dictators decide sequentially how much to give to a
recipient. They ﬁnd that, on average, the amount given by the ﬁrst dictator does not affect the second dictator’s giving. At
the individual level, they observe substantial heterogeneity in the second dictator’s responses: while some dictators increase
their giving in the amount given by the peer, others give less when the peer gives more, and others do not vary their giving
with the peer’s giving. We observe similar heterogeneity in our experiment. This suggests that a potential explanation for
the limited support of the norm compliance model in our experiments may lie in the existence of conﬂicting views about
what constitutes a norm in our setting. In Section 5 we examine this possibility in detail and show that there is considerable
heterogeneity in the extent to which participants agree on what a norm is in our experiments as well as in the extent to
which they are prepared to comply with it. 
2. Theoretical framework 
To illustrate our empirical strategy to identify the importance of peers for norms of fair sharing, we start by sketching
a simple theoretical framework based on the social norms model introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013 , hereafter KW).
We assume that decision-makers are motivated by both material self-interest and a preference for conforming to norms, i.e.
collectively recognized rules of behavior that deﬁne which actions are viewed as socially appropriate ( Elster, 1989; Ostrom,
20 0 0 ). Thus, decision-maker i ’s utility function is given by: 
U i = πi + γi N( a i | a −i ) 4 However, in all games studied by Krupka and Weber (2013) there is only one dictator matched with one recipient and so they cannot study peer effects 
in fair sharing. See also List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) , who compare a standard dictator game with a game where the dictator’s choice set includes the 
option to take money from the recipient, and Goerg and Walkowitz (2010) , who compare public good game experiments framed with positive externalities 
to those framed with negative externalities. 
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 where a i and a −i are the actions undertaken by the decision-maker and by others, respectively, and π i represents the
decision-maker’s material payoff. The second term of the utility function captures the preference for norm compliance. The
parameter γ i measures the extent to which the decision-maker cares about conforming to norms. The social norms function
N (.) describes the mapping between utility and the collectively-recognized social appropriateness of the actions available to
the decision-maker. Decision-makers who care about norm compliance ( γ i > 0) enjoy a positive utility by selecting ac-
tions that are viewed as socially appropriate (i.e., actions whereby N (.) > 0), whereas they suffer a disutility from actions
that are inappropriate ( N (.) < 0). Note that we do not specify, at this stage, what norms individuals may follow in their
decision-making. Following KW, we instead measure these norms empirically, as we describe in detail in the next section. 5
Our only assumption regarding the norms function at this stage is that what constitutes appropriate behavior depends on
social and contextual inﬂuences. In particular, we assume that the social appropriateness of an action a i is inﬂuenced by
a −i , the actions of other decision-makers that i can observe. 6 
Our empirical strategy relies on two types of experiments: a norm-elicitation experiment that we use to measure the
social norms function N (.), and a standard behavioral experiment to examine how changes in the norms function translate
into actual decisions. To explore the role of social inﬂuences, we systematically vary whether decision-makers observe the
actions of another decision-maker (a “peer”) before making a choice, or whether they instead observe a random “choice”
made by Nature. We thus study how the norm functions N( a i | a −i ) varies when the action a −i observed by the decision
maker is taken by a peer or by Nature. To explore the role of contextual inﬂuences, we study two distinct decision settings
that are economically equivalent (i.e. in both settings the same actions produce the same material payoffs π i ), but differ in
how actions are framed and thus in the norms N (.) that potentially apply to each setting. The next section describes each
experiment and each experimental condition in detail. 
3. Experimental design and procedures 
All our treatments are based on dictator game experiments. The Peer treatment is based on a three-person sequential
dictator game where two dictators (D 1 and D 2 ) are matched with one recipient (R). Dictators move sequentially: D 1 moves
ﬁrst and chooses a monetary transfer for the recipient; D 2 observes the transfer chosen by D 1 and then chooses a transfer. In
the Give version of the game, D 1 and D 2 receive an initial endowment of £12 each, while the recipient is endowed with £0.
Each dictator can then transfer an amount g i ∈ {D1, D2} ∈ {£0, £1, £2, £3, £4} from her endowment to the recipient. Monetary
payoffs are computed as π i =£12 – g i for a dictator, and πR = £0 + g D1 + g D2 for the recipient. 7 
We study how D 2 ’s behavior is affected by information about their peer’s (D 1 ) behavior, by comparing choices made in
the Peer treatment with choices made in the NoPeer treatment, where the role of D 1 is replaced with Nature. Thus, the
NoPeer treatment is based on a two-person dictator game, where one dictator is matched with one recipient. In the Give
version of the game, the dictator receives an endowment of £12 while the recipient’s endowment, E = {£0, £1, £2, £3, £4}, is
randomly determined by Nature. After observing the value of the recipient’s endowment, the dictator transfers an amount g
∈ {£0, £1, £2, £3, £4} to the recipient. Payoffs are computed as πD =£12 – g for the dictator, and πR = E + g for the recipient.
Note that in both treatments we observe decisions by dictators facing the same ﬁve possible situations, each correspond-
ing to a different level of initial wealth of the recipient (£0, £1, £2, £3, or £4). The difference between the two treatments is
that in the Peer treatment the recipient’s wealth (prior to the dictator’s transfer) is determined by the donation of another
dictator, whereas in NoPeer the peer is absent and the recipient’s wealth is determined at random. 8 
The corresponding Take versions of the games are analogously deﬁned, except that the initial distributions of endow-
ments differ relative to the Give version. In the Peer / Take game, D 1 and D 2 are endowed with £9 each, while the recipient5 This is one of the main advantanges of the social norms model relative to outcome-based models of social preferences like, e.g., the Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) model of inequality aversion. The norms model can in principle nest an outcome-based model of inequality aversion if, for example, the norms 
prescribes payoff equality. However, the norms model is able to capture the effect of contextual and social factors that may have no payoff consequences 
but yet profoundly change the perception of appropriantess of actions available to the decision maker, and hence their behavior. 
6 Of course, actions are not the only channel through which other decision-makers can inﬂuence norms. For instance, they may affect perceptions of 
appropriateness by providing advice about norms or simply through scrutiny of the decision-maker’s actions (see e.g. Schram and Charness, 2015 ). We 
do not explicitly model these alternative channels in our utility function because the focus of our experiments will be on the effects of peers’ actions on 
norms. 
7 Note that we use a truncated action space relative to the standard dictator game. We did this because, as we describe later, in our norm-elicitation 
experiment subjects are asked to rate the appropriateness of all the actions available to dictators in all possible situations that they may face. With our 
truncated action space this already implies that subjects submit 25 ratings (5 actions x 5 possible situations). We thought that increasing the number of 
actions available to dictators might make the task diﬃcult to manage for subjects in the norm-elicitation experiment. Also note that payoff equalization is 
possible in our dictator game, although this requires both dictators giving £4 to the recipient (which results in a payoff of £8 for each player). Dictators 
can always unilaterally minimize payoff inequalities between themselves and the recipient by choosing the most generous action in the set. 
8 Note that our focus is on comparing situations where the dictator can be affected by a peer with situations where the peer cannot by construction 
exert any inﬂuence on the dictator’s choices. Thus, in our NoPeer treatment we remove the peer from the decision setting and transform the three-person 
dictator game used in the Peer treatment into a two-person dictator game. An implication of this is that, in principle, the two treatments differ along 
more than one dimension (whether or not the dictator can observe the choice of a peer and whether the situation is a two-person or three-person game). 
An alternative treatment to control for this would be one where a passive dictator is added to the NoPeer game. We did not run this additional control 
treatment because doing so while keeping the design balanced would have required an additional 500 subjects and we do not expect behavior in this 
treatment to differ from that observed in our NoPeer treatment. In Section 5.3 we discuss possible implications of comparing treatments that involve 
three-player interaction with treatments involving two-player interaction, with particular reference to payoff comparison considerations. 
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Table 1 
Treatment overview and number of subjects per treatment/game. 
Peer treatment NoPeer treatment 
Give game Norm-elicitation exp.: 36 Behavioral exp.: 216 (72 per role) Norm-elicitation exp.: 30 Behavioral exp.: 142 (71 per role) 
Take game Norm-elicitation exp.: 36 Behavioral exp.: 216 (72 per role) Norm-elicitation exp.: 32 Behavioral exp.: 142 (71 per role) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is endowed with £6. Each dictator can give/take an amount t i ∈ {D1, D2} ∈ { −£3, −£2, −£1, £0, £1} to/from the recipient. Payoffs
are computed as π i =£9 – t i for a dictator, and πR = £6 + t D1 + t D2 for the recipient. Analogously, in the NoPeer / Take game
the dictator is endowed with £9, while the recipient’s endowment is randomly determined from the set E = {£3, £4, £5, £6,
£7}. The dictator transfers an amount t ∈ { −£3, −£2, −£1, £0, £1} to the recipient, and payoffs are computed as πD =£9
– t for the dictator, and πR = E + t for the recipient. Thus, in both the Give and Take version of the games, dictators can
implement exactly the same ﬁnal payoff allocations between themselves and recipients. However, the Give and Take games
differ in whether these allocations can be obtained through “giving to” or “taking from” the recipient. 
For each treatment and each version of the game, we conducted two types of experiments: a norm-elicitation experiment
and a behavioral experiment. The norm-elicitation experiment is based on the task introduced by KW. Subjects were given a
description of the ﬁve possible situations faced by either D 2 in the Peer treatment or the dictator in the NoPeer treatment.
We conducted separate sessions for the Give and Take versions of the games. In each case, subjects had to evaluate, for
each of the ﬁve situations, the appropriateness of each of the ﬁve actions that were available to the dictator. For example,
subjects in the Peer/Give condition read a description of a situation where D 2 observes that D 1 has given £0 to the recipient
and must decide whether to give £0, £1, £2, £,3 or £4. For each of the possible ﬁve actions available to D 2 , subjects were
asked to rate, on a six-point scale, whether that action was “socially appropriate” and “consistent with what most people
expect [a dictator] ought to do”, or “socially inappropriate” and “inconsistent with what most people expect [a dictator]
ought to do”. 9 Similarly, subjects rated the appropriateness of each of the ﬁve dictator actions in the other four situations
where D 1 had given £1, £2, £3 and £4 to the recipient. 
10 
Similar to KW, subjects received a monetary reward if their appropriateness judgments matched the judgments provided
by other subjects in their session. In particular, they were told that one of ﬁve possible situations, and one of the ﬁve
actions available to the dictator in that situation, would be selected at random at the end of the session. Subjects were paid
£7 (in addition to a £5 show-up fee) if their appropriateness rating for the selected action matched the rating of one other
randomly selected subject in the session. 11 Thus, as in KW, subjects were given incentives to reveal what they perceived to
be the collectively-shared judgment of appropriateness of the actions they evaluated, and not their own personal judgment.
Hence, a subject in the norm-elicitation experiment plays 25 coordination games over appropriateness ratings (with no
feedback between games) with another randomly selected participant. 12 
We conducted the behavioral experiments with subjects who had not participated in the norm-elicitation task. Subjects
were randomly assigned to either the P eer or NoPeer treatment. In each treatment, half of the subjects participated in the
Give game, and the other half in the Take game. In all cases, we paid subjects a £2 show-up fee in addition to any earnings
made in the experiment. 13 At the beginning of the experiment we matched subjects randomly into groups and assigned a
role. In the P eer treatment subjects were matched in three-person groups and assigned the role of D 1 , D 2 , or Recipient. In
the NoPeer treatment, subjects were matched in two-person groups and assigned either the role of dictator or recipient.
Subjects then played a one-shot version of the dictator game, either in the Give or Take frame. We elicited subjects’ choices
using the strategy method ( Selten, 1967 ). That is, dictators in the role of D 2 in the P eer treatment and dictators in the
NoPeer treatment were asked to make one decision for each of the ﬁve possible sub-games of the game, corresponding
to situations where D 1 or Nature had endowed the recipient with £0, £1, £2, £3, or £4 (£3, £4, £5, £6, or £7 in the Take
game). 14 
In total, we conducted 44 sessions with 850 subjects, recruited using ORSEE ( Greiner, 2015 ). All sessions were con-
ducted at the University of Nottingham using z-Tree ( Fischbacher, 2007 ). Sessions lasted between 40 and 60 min. Table 19 This approach follows Krupka et al. (2017) . The six possible levels of appropriateness were “very socially inappropriate”, “socially inappropriate”, “some- 
what socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially appropriate”, “socially appropriate” or “very socially appropriate”. Note that we did not use the word 
“dictator” in the instructions, but we referred to the subjects in the role of the dictator as “Individual X” or “Individual Y”. See Online Appendix A for a 
copy of the instructions. 
10 Similarly, in the NoPeer treatment participants were asked to rate the appropriateness of each of the ﬁve actions available to the dictator in each of 
the ﬁve possible situations corresponding to the ﬁve different levels of endowment of the recipient. 
11 This approach also follows Krupka et al. (2017) . This incentivizes subjects to match the modal response of an individual randomly drawn from the 
population, rather than the modal response in the population as in KW. 
12 The material incentives used in the norm-elicitation task generate a coordination game with multiple equilibria. KW argue that collectively-shared 
norms create focal points in this game, which subjects may exploit to successfully coordinate. A similar approach has been applied to the classiﬁcation of 
natural language messages by Xiao and Houser (2005) and Houser and Xiao (2011) . 
13 Note that the show-up fee for the behavioral experiments is lower than the show-up fee used in the norm-elicitation experiments. These values of the 
show-up fees were chosen to ensure that average hourly earnings were approximately £10 in each experiment. 
14 Most of the experimental literature directly comparing choices elicited with the strategy method and the direct response method ﬁnd that the two 
elicitation methods do not lead to qualitatively different results. See Brandts and Charness (2011) for a review. 
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Fig. 1. Elicited norms (social appropriateness) across treatments. 
Notes : We transformed subjects’ appropriateness ratings into numerical scores using the following scale: very socially inappropriate = −1; 
inappropriate = −0.6; somewhat socially inappropriate = −0.2; somewhat socially appropriate = 0.2; socially appropriate = 0.6; very socially appropriate 
= 1. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 summarizes the experiment design and reports the number of subjects who participated in each treatment and version of
the game. 
4. Results 
We start by presenting the data from the norm-elicitation experiments, to examine whether the behavior of peers inﬂu-
ences the norms of fair sharing in our setting. We then turn to the behavioral data, and examine whether any differences
in norms across conditions translates into differences in sharing behavior. 
4.1. Norm-elicitation experiments: the inﬂuence of peers on norms of fair sharing 
Fig. 1 reports the average ratings of appropriateness collected in the norm-elicitation experiments. We report the full
distributions of appropriateness ratings in Online Appendix B and an analysis of the variation of ratings in Section 5.1 ( Fig. 3
in particular). The average social appropriateness ratings of dictator transfers in the P eer treatment are shown in the top-left
( Give game) and bottom-left ( Take game) panels of the ﬁgure. The ratings of the NoPeer treatment are shown in the right
panels of the ﬁgure. In each panel, we show ratings for each of the ﬁve possible situations faced by a dictator, corresponding
to the ﬁve possible levels of wealth of the recipient determined either by D 1 ’s transfers (P eer ) or by chance ( NoPeer ). 
15 
Several interesting patterns can be observed. First, in all ﬁve situations and in all treatments and versions of the game,
the appropriateness of transfers increases in their generosity: sharing the highest amount available (“give £4 ′′ in Give ; “give
£1 ′′ in Take ) is always considered the most appropriate option. Similarly, in all cases, the least appropriate choice is the
level of sharing that maximizes the dictator’s payoff (“give £0 ′′ in Give ; “take £3 ′′ in Take ). 16 15 For example, the dashed red line in the top-left panel of Fig. 1 shows the average appropriateness ratings of D 2 ’s transfers in the situation where D 1 
has given £4 to the recipient. The dashed red line in the top-right panel of the ﬁgure shows instead the appropriateness of the dictator’s transfers in the 
situation where the recipient was randomly endowed with £4. The interpretation of the bottom panels is similar, except that the games use a take frame. 
16 Moreover, as in KW, we observe consistent differences between the appropriateness ratings of transfers that involve giving relative to transfers that 
involve taking, with the latter being generally evaluated as less appropriate than the former. See Online Appendix B for further details. 
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Table 2 
The inﬂuence of peer behavior on social appropriateness. 
Model I Peer treatment Model II NoPeer treatment 
Amount transferred by Dictator 0.359 ∗∗∗ 0.411 ∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.015) 
Amount transferred by Peer/Nature −0.117 ∗∗∗ 0.088 ∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.013) 
Amount transf. by Peer/Nature ∗ Amount transf. by Dictator 0.019 ∗∗∗ −0.009 ∗
(0.006) (0.005) 
Take −0.204 ∗∗∗ −0.110 ∗
(0.056) (0.058) 
Amount transf. by Peer/Nature ∗ Take 0.052 ∗∗ −0.037 ∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.013) 
Constant −0.521 ∗∗∗ −0.895 ∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.050) 
N. 1800 1550 
R 2 0.66 0.71 
Notes : OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the appropriateness of dictator’s transfers. Standard errors in parentheses, 
adjusted for intragroup correlation (subjects are used as independent clustering units). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; 
∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Second, the level of the recipient’s wealth generally inﬂuences the perception of what constitutes an appropriate level
of sharing. These differences are, however, much more marked in the Give than in the Take game. Thus, the norms of fair
sharing in the Give game seem much more malleable than the corresponding norms in the Take game. 
Third, and most importantly, the levels of the recipient’s wealth inﬂuence ratings of appropriateness differently depend-
ing on whether these levels have been determined by the transfers of another dictator (P eer treatment) or by chance
( NoPeer treatment). In the P eer treatment giving little to the recipient is generally viewed as less appropriate when the
recipient’s wealth is large (i.e., when the peer has been generous) than when a recipient’s wealth is small (i.e., when the
peer has also given little). 17 However, in the NoPeer treatment the relation between appropriateness and recipient’s wealth
is reversed: giving little to the recipient is viewed as more appropriate when the recipient’s wealth is large (i.e. when Nature
selects a large endowment) than when it is small. 18 
We examine these patterns more formally using OLS regressions, reported in Table 2 . In Model I we use data from the
Peer treatment only, whereas in Model II we use data from the NoPeer treatment only. In both regressions, the dependent
variable measures the appropriateness of the dictator’s transfers in the ﬁve different situations. We regress this on the
amount that the dictator transfers to the recipient (“Amount transferred by Dictator”), the amount that the peer ( Peer
treatment) or Nature ( NoPeer treatment) transfers to the recipient (“Amount transferred by Peer/Nature”), and an interaction
between these two variables. Moreover, to gauge the extent to which the inﬂuence of peers varies across the Give and Take
games, we also include a dummy variable taking value 1 for observations in the Take game, and an interaction between the
Take dummy and the “Amount transferred by Peer/Nature” variable. 
The regressions reveal that in both the Peer and the NoPeer treatments more generous transfers by the dictator are
viewed as more appropriate than ungenerous transfers. The effect of increasing the dictator’s transfer on its evaluation
of appropriateness is 0.359 + 0.019 ∗ “Amount transferred by Peer” in the Peer treatment and 0.411 − 0.009 ∗ “Amount
transferred by Nature” in the NoPeer treatment. In both cases, the effect is positive for any possible amount transferred by
the peer or Nature. 
To gauge how changes in the recipient’s wealth affect the judgments of appropriateness of the dictator’s transfers, we
need to inspect the coeﬃcients of the variable “Amount transferred by Peer/Nature” and the interaction term “Amount
transferred by Dictator ∗ Amount transferred by Peer/Nature” (as well as the interaction with the Take dummy, for the Take
game). In the Peer treatment, the peer’s generosity negatively inﬂuences the judgments of appropriateness of the dicta-
tor’s transfers. This effect is particularly marked for ungenerous dictator’s transfers, while the inﬂuence of peers wanes for
more generous dictator transfers, as indicated by the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the interaction term between the
“Amount transferred by Dictator” and “Amount transferred by Peer/Nature” variables. In contrast, in the NoPeer treatment 
the judgments of appropriateness of the dictator’s transfers become more lenient the higher is the endowment that Nature
transfers to the recipient. Again, this effect is particularly marked for ungenerous dictator transfers and it diminishes as
dictators transfer more money to the recipient, as indicated by the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the interaction
term. 17 For example, in the Give game (top-left panel of Fig. 1 ), giving £2 to the recipient is viewed as socially inappropriate (an average rating of −0.36) when 
the peer gives £4 to the recipient (dashed red line), but as socially appropriate (an average rating of 0.14) when the peer gives £0 to the recipient (solid 
blue line). Wilcoxon signed rank test result: p < 0.001. 
18 For example, in the Give game (top-right panel of Fig. 1 ), giving £2 to the recipient is viewed as socially appropriate (an average rating of 0.28) 
when the recipient receives an endowment of £4 (dashed red line), but as socially inappropriate (an average rating of −0.04) when recipient receives an 
endowment of £0 (solid blue line). Wilcoxon signed rank test result: p < 0.001. 
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Fig. 2. Dictator’s transfers across treatments. 
Notes : Bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Finally, in both treatments, the impact of the recipient’s wealth on norms is signiﬁcantly weaker in the Take than in the
Give game. This can be seen by noticing that, in both the Peer and the NoPeer treatments, the coeﬃcient of the interaction
term “Amount transferred by Peer/Nature ∗ Take ” takes an opposite sign relative to the “Amount transferred by Peer/Nature”
variable. In both cases the effect is signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level. 
To account for the ordinal nature of the norms data, we ran additional ordinal probit regressions. The results are similar
to those reported in Table 2 . Moreover, we complement the regression analysis from Table 2 by a further speciﬁcation in
which we pool the data from the Peer and NoPeer treatment and include a Peer treatment dummy as well as all relevant
interactions. The results show that the differences between the Peer and NoPeer treatment discussed above are highly
signiﬁcant. Both supplementary regression tables are presented in Online Appendix D. 
Taken together, these results show that the behavior of peers can have a strong, systematic inﬂuence on the perception
of what constitutes a norm of fair sharing in our setting. What are the behavioral implications of these results? Assume
that, as in the model sketched in Section 2 , individuals trade off monetary payoff and norm-compliance utility, whereby
individuals gain utility from choosing actions that are viewed as socially appropriate and suffer a disutility from choosing
socially inappropriate actions. Within this framework, one would expect a negative effect of the recipient’s endowment on
giving in the NoPeer treatment: norm-compliant dictators should be more generous when the recipient possesses a small
endowment because then ungenerous transfers are more inappropriate (and hence result in stronger disutility) than when
the recipient has a large endowment. In contrast, one would expect a positive relation between the peer’s and the dictator’s
transfers in the Peer treatment. In this case, ungenerous transfers are more appropriate when the recipient is poorer than
when the recipient receives a larger transfer from the peer. Moreover, we would expect these effects to be stronger in the
Give than in the Take version of the game. We summarize these behavioral predictions as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: In the NoPeer treatment, dictator’s transfers correlate negatively with the recipient’s initial wealth. 
Hypothesis 2: In the Peer treatment, dictator’s transfers correlate positively with the amount that the recipient received
from the peer. 
Hypothesis 3: These effects are stronger in Give than in Take games. 
In the next sub-section we present the data from our behavioral experiments to examine the extent to which the ob-
served variations in social appropriateness of transfers translate in differences in behavior. 
4.2. Behavioral experiments: the inﬂuence of peers on sharing behavior 
Fig. 2 shows the average monetary transfers made by dictators in the Peer (left panel) and NoPeer (right panel) treat-
ments across the ﬁve possible sub-games of the game. In each panel the ﬁgure reports the average transfers made in the
Give (dark bars) and Take (light bars) versions of the games. In the Take game, transfers have been rescaled to give a score
between £0 and £4, to ease comparability with the Give game. 19 
The ﬁgure shows that there is on average no clear relation between the dictator’s transfers and the recipient’s wealth in
the Peer treatment, both in the Give and Take versions of the games. Thus, whether or not the peer is generous with the
recipient does not seem to affect the dictator’s sharing decisions. In contrast, a negative relation between dictator’s sharing
and recipient’s wealth seems to emerge in the NoPeer treatment, in both versions of the game. Thus, dictators seem to
behave less generously towards recipients that have randomly received larger endowments. 
Table 3 reports OLS regressions of dictator’s transfers on a variable measuring the amount that the peer ( Peer treatment)
or Nature ( NoPeer treatment) transfers to the recipient, a dummy variable taking value 1 for observations in the Take game,19 Since a transfer of −£3 (i.e., taking £3 from the recipient) in the Take game has the same consequences for ﬁnal wealth as a transfer of £0 in the Give 
game, the transfer of −£3 has been rescaled to £0. Similarly, transfers of −£2, −£1, £0 and £1 in the Take game have been rescaled to £1, £2, £3 and £4, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 
The inﬂuence of peers’ behavior on dictators’ transfers. 
Model I Peer treatment Model II NoPeer treatment 
Amount transferred by Peer/Nature −0.006 −0.313 ∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.040) 
Take 0.103 0.006 
(0.283) (0.281) 
Amount transferred by Peer/Nature ∗ Take −0.024 0.011 
(0.067) (0.063) 
Constant 1.483 ∗∗∗ 1.842 ∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.197) 
N. 720 710 
R 2 0.001 0.086 
Notes : OLS regressions. Dependent variable is dictator’s transfers. Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted 
for intragroup correlation (subjects are used as independent clustering units). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 
0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and an interaction between the two variables. Similar to Table 2 , we run separate regressions for the Peer treatment (Model
I) and the NoPeer treatment (Model II). 
Model I conﬁrms that there is on average no evidence of peer effects in the Give version of the Peer treatment: the
amount transferred by the peer has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the amount transferred by the dictator ( p = 0.914). This
similarly holds in the Take version, as indicated by the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of the interaction term “Amount transferred
by Peer/Nature ∗ Take” ( p = 0.727). 
In contrast, the recipient’s wealth is negatively related to the dictator’s transfers in the Give version of the NoPeer
treatment. Model II shows that increasing the recipient’s wealth by £1 reduces the dictator’s giving by about £0.30, and the
effect is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This negative relation between recipient’s wealth and giving is not different across the
Give and Take versions of the game, as indicated by the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of the interaction term ( p = 0.858). 
These results are only partially in line with the results of the norm-elicitation experiment. The negative relation between
recipient’s wealth and dictator’s transfers in the NoPeer treatment is consistent with Hypothesis 1. However, the results
of the norm-elicitation experiment also suggest that we should observe a positive relation between recipient’s wealth and
dictator’s transfers in the Peer treatment (Hypothesis 2). Our data do not support this conjecture. Moreover, the norm-
elicitation experiment suggests that the norm of fair sharing may be more malleable in the giving than taking setting (Hy-
pothesis 3). However, we do not observe any difference between Give and Take games in the extent to which the recipient’s
wealth affects dictator’s sharing. More generally, we see only small differences in dictator’s behavior between the Give and
Take games, and only in some subgames of the Peer treatment. This is interesting because KW have shown that using
give/take frames in dictator games can produce strong differences in behavior. However, we cannot replicate this result: in
our NoPeer treatment, which is most similar to the games used by KW, we do not observe any difference in dictator shar-
ing between Give and Take games, despite the existence of differences in the norms that apply to these games (see Online
Appendix C for further detail). 
5. Explaining the experimental data 
What can explain the observed discrepancies between the norm-elicitation and behavioral experiments? One striking 
aspect of the behavioral data is that we observe substantial heterogeneity at the individual level in the extent to which
dictators are inﬂuenced by the level of wealth of recipients (see Online Appendix D for more details). About half of the
dictators are not affected by the recipient’s wealth and opt for the same monetary transfer across all ﬁve sub-games. A third
of dictators reduce their transfer as the recipient’s wealth increases, whereas about a tenth of dictators respond positively to
increases in the recipient’s wealth. Our ﬁndings are similar to those reported by Panchanathan et al. (2013) in a three-person
dictator game that is closely related to our Peer/Give treatment. They ﬁnd that about half of dictators do not respond to
variations in the peer’s behavior, a third give more when the peer gives less, and thirteen-percent give more when the peer
gives more. 
This suggests that there may be substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which dictators are willing to comply with
norms of fair sharing, or in the extent to which they recognize these norms as applicable. Alternatively, (at least some)
dictators may be driven by other types of considerations (e.g. inequity aversion; guilt aversion), that may conﬂict with nor-
mative considerations and pull behavior away from compliance with norms of fair sharing. The next sub-sections investigate
these potential explanations. 
5.1. Norm ambiguity 
A ﬁrst possible explanation for our experimental results is that there may be substantial disagreement among subjects
about what constitutes a norm of appropriate behavior in our experiments. As we discussed earlier ( Section 4.1 ), in the
absence of peers, individuals seem to apply a Rawlsian norm of fair sharing in our experiments, whereby the appropriateness
S. Gächter et al. / European Economic Review 97 (2017) 72–86 81 
Fig. 3. Disagreement on the appropriateness of actions across treatments. 
Notes : The bars show the percentage of subjects disagreeing with the majority view about the appropriateness of an action. Dark (blue) bars indicate that 
a minority of subjects rates an action as appropriate, when most subjects rate it as inappropriate. Light (red) bars show disagreement in the opposite 
direction. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 of giving depends in part on the level of need of the recipient. When the peer is present, a different normative consideration
is introduced as individuals recognize that the appropriateness of giving also depends on the peer’s behavior (what Cialdini,
2001 refers to as the "principle of social proof"). Our norm experiments show that on average the principle of social proof
overrides the Rawlsian norm of sharing in the Peer treatments (see Fig. 1 ). Nevertheless, it is conceivable that both norms
remain active in our experiments, exerting divergent inﬂuences on behavior and potentially explaining the weak support for
the norms model in the Peer treatments. 
To examine this, we take a closer look at the norms data. Recall that in the norm-elicitation experiment subjects could
rate the appropriateness of actions on a scale with three levels of “inappropriateness” (very inappropriate, somewhat inap-
propriate, inappropriate) and three levels of “appropriateness” (very appropriate, somewhat appropriate, appropriate). Fig. 3
shows the percentage of subjects disagreeing with the majority view about the appropriateness of each action across the
various situations that they rated. 20 We say that a majority of subjects rate an action as appropriate (inappropriate) if20 The ﬁgure builds on Tables B1-B5 in Online Appendix B, which report the full distributions of appropriateness ratings across our treatments. 
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 the sum of the relative frequencies of the ratings “very appropriate”, “somewhat appropriate” and “appropriate” is greater
(lower) than 50%.The light (red) bars indicate that there is a minority of subjects assigning one of the three levels of “inap-
propriateness” to an action, while the majority rated the action as appropriate. The dark (blue) bars show disagreement in
the opposite direction (the majority view the action as inappropriate and a minority rates it as appropriate). For instance,
the ﬁrst dark bar in the top left panel of the ﬁgure shows that in the Peer/Give treatment 12% of subjects rated the action
“give £0 ′′ as appropriate in the scenario where the peer also gives £0, indicating that the remaining 88% of subjects rated it
as inappropriate. 21 
To assess the presence of norm ambiguity, consider ﬁrst the NoPeer/Give treatment (top right panel). In most cases,
relatively few subjects (less than 20%) disagree on the social appropriateness of actions. The main source of disagreement
among subjects is the action “give £2 ′′ , which between one-ﬁfth and one-half of subjects view as inappropriate in contrast
with the majoritarian view that the action is appropriate. Nevertheless, apart from this action, the general picture emerging
from the NoPeer/Give treatment is that there is a reasonably low degree of ambiguity about the social norm in this setting.
Consider now the Peer/Give treatment (top left panel). As in the NoPeer/Give treatment, there is little disagreement
about the actions “give £0 ′′ and “give £4 ′′ . Also as in NoPeer/Give , subjects tend to disagree on how to rate the action “give
£2 ′′ . However, relative to the NoPeer/Give treatment, subjects also disagree more on how to rate the actions “give £1 ′′ and
“give £3 ′′ . For both actions there are at least some scenarios where about 40% of subjects disagree with the majority view.
Moreover, the source of disagreement seems to be related to the behavior of the peer. For example, when the peer gives £1
most subjects view the dictator action “give £1 ′′ as appropriate, presumably following the principle of social proof. However,
41% of subjects disagree and rate it as inappropriate, presumably following a Rawlsian norm similar to the one that subjects
recognize in the NoPeer treatment. As another example, the dictator action “give £3 ′′ is generally viewed as appropriate by
a majority of subjects. However, when the peer gives £4, 42% of subjects rate this action as inappropriate, again presumably
because this action compares unfavorably with the peer’s action. Overall, the observed patterns of disagreement suggest that
observing what a peer has decided to do may introduce some ambiguity about the social norm. 
Finally, Fig. 3 corroborates our previous observation that the norm in the Take treatment (bottom panels) is substantially
less malleable than the norm in Give . For all actions and in both the Peer and NoPeer condition, very few subjects dis-
agree with the majoritarian view about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of actions. The degree of agreement seems
somewhat stronger in the NoPeer condition, but again the differences are small. 
To summarize, this qualitative analysis suggests that disagreement among subjects about what constitutes a norm of
appropriate behavior can go some way in explaining the lack of support for the norm model in our experiments. 
5.2. Heterogeneity in norm compliance 
Another explanation for our experimental results is that there may be heterogeneity in preferences for norm compliance
in the population of dictators we sampled for our experiment. Thus, even if norms of fair sharing were prominent and clear
in the population, not all dictators would be willing to follow these norms. Moreover, the dictators’ willingness to follow
norms may itself vary across treatment conditions. To explore these possibilities, we follow the econometric methodology
used by KW and related papers and investigate the extent to which elicited norms can predict actual behavior in our exper-
iments. Differently from previous papers, we use a mixed logit model (see, e.g., Train, 2003 ) that allows for heterogeneity
in the concerns for norm compliance and allows us to estimate, for each treatment, the share of dictators that are in fact
guided by a desire to follow social norms. 
In order to do so we follow the theoretical framework introduced in Section 2 and assume that the utility that dictator
i derives from choosing a monetary transfer k in situation s depends on the material payoff implied by the transfer and
the social appropriateness of the transfer. We also assume that dictators are heterogeneous in their concerns for norm
compliance. Thus, dictator i ’s utility takes the form: 
U iks = θπiks + γi N ks + ε iks 
where π iks is dictator i ’s material payoff associated with transfer k in situation s , and N ks is the average appropriateness
rating of the transfer, as measured in the norm-elicitation experiment. The parameter θ measures the weight that dictators
place on monetary payoffs, while γ i is an individual-speciﬁc parameter measuring the extent to which the dictator cares
about norm compliance. Note that we are assuming homogenous preferences for money across subjects, but we allow for
heterogeneous preferences for norm compliance. The term ɛ iks is a random error term, assumed to be i.i.d. extreme value
distributed. 
21 Note that the lowest possible level of disagreement occurs when all subjects agree on rating an action as either appropriate, or inappropriate. This is 
the case, for example, for the action “give £0” when the recipient’s wealth is £0 in the NoPeer/Give treatment: the absence of a bar in Fig. 3 indicates that 
all subjects agreed on how to rate that action. On the other hand, the highest possible level of disagreement occurs when half of the subjects rate an action 
as appropriate and the other half rate it as inappropriate. This is the case for the action “give £2” when the recipient’s wealth is £0 in the NoPeer/Give 
treatment. 
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Table 4 
Mixed logit models. 
Model I Peer / Give Model II Peer / Take Model III NoPeer / Give Model IV NoPeer / Take 
Own payoff 0.781 ∗∗∗ 0.654 ∗∗ 3.186 ∗∗∗ 0.890 ∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.268) (0.988) (0.299) 
Norm rating (mean) 0.182 −1.257 6.089 ∗∗ −0.462 
(1.036) (1.166) (2.747) (1.119) 
Norm rating (st. dev.) 7.132 ∗∗∗ 7.288 ∗∗∗ 4.832 ∗∗∗ 3.986 ∗∗∗
(1.216) (1.278) (0.715) (0.664) 
N. 1800 1800 1775 1775 
Log-likelihood −395.212 −370.768 −381.325 −398.907 
Notes : Mixed logit regressions. The dependent variable takes value 1 for the monetary transfer that was chosen by a dictator in a 
given sub-game, and value 0 for the other transfers that were not chosen. Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗
p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conditional on γ i , the probability that dictator i chooses monetary transfer k in situation s depends on the utility asso-
ciated with that choice, U iks , relative to the utility associated with the other alternatives: 
L iks ( γi ) = 
exp { U iks ) } ∑ 
j=1 , ... , 5 exp 
{
U i js 
} , k = 1 , . . . , 5 . 
Also conditional on γ i , the probability of observing a given sequence of monetary transfers by dictator i across the ﬁve
possible situations (i.e. the ﬁve sub-games of the game) is given by: 
P i ( γi ) = 
∏ 
s =1 , ... , 5 
L ik ( i,s ) s ( γi ) 
where k ( i, s ) denotes the choice of dictator i in subgame s . The unconditional distribution of a sequence of monetary trans-
fers involves integrating the conditional probability over the distribution of γ : 
P i = 
∫ 
P i ( γi ) f (γ | ω) dγ
where f ( γ | ω) is the density of γ and ω are the parameters of the distribution. We assume that γ follows a normal distribu-
tion with mean g and standard deviation h, γ ∼ N ( g, h ), and we estimate the parameters of the distribution using maximum
simulated likelihood ( Hole, 2007 ). 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation. We estimate four different models, one for each treatment/game combi-
nation. 22 In all models, the coeﬃcient on own payoff is positive and highly signiﬁcant, indicating that dictators are more
likely to choose transfers that yield higher own payoffs. 
Turning to norm compliance, Table 4 reports the mean and standard deviation of the norm rating coeﬃcients. Looking
ﬁrst at the estimates of the mean, the regressions conﬁrm the limited success of the norms compliance model in explaining
the behavioral data. In the Peer treatment (Models I and II) the average effect of norm ratings on the choice of monetary
transfers is not signiﬁcantly different from zero: on average, dictators do not choose transfers that are deemed more so-
cially appropriate more often. In the NoPeer treatment (Models III and IV) the effect is positive and signiﬁcant in the Give
game, indicating that the average dictator is more likely to choose transfers that are more socially appropriate. The effect is,
however, not signiﬁcantly different from zero in the Take game. 
Lastly, note that in all models the standard deviations of the norm coeﬃcients are positive and highly signiﬁcant, con-
ﬁrming that there is substantial heterogeneity in preferences for norm compliance in our sample. We can use the estimated
means and standard deviations of the coeﬃcients to make inferences on the share of dictators that place a positive weight
on norm compliance. In particular, the share of dictators placing a positive weight on norm compliance is given by ( ˆ  g/ ˆ h ) ,
where  is the cumulative normal distribution, and ˆ g and ˆ h are the mean and standard deviation of the norm ratings coef-
ﬁcients ( Hole, 2007 ). In the Peer treatment and in the Take game of the NoPeer treatment, we calculate that between 51%
and 57% of dictators place a positive weight on the norms rating, i.e. display a preference for norm compliance. Thus, only
about half of our subjects seem to care about the appropriateness of actions when they make their choices. The fraction
of norm-compliant individuals is comparably higher in the Give game of the NoPeer treatment: here the share of norm-
compliant dictators is about 90%. Indeed, as discussed in the previous sections, the Give game of the NoPeer treatment is
the one experimental condition where the observed behavioral patterns are most consistent with the elicited norms. 22 In Online Appendix D we report additional analyses of norm compliance where i) we perform the analysis using the median rather than the mean of 
the distribution of ratings in order to reduce the inﬂuence of outliers (normative disagreement) that we have discussed in the previous sub-section; ii) we 
address the issue of collinearity between the own payoff and average norm rating variable following an econometric approach suggested by Thomsson and 
Vostroknutov (2016) , and iii) we estimate one model of norm compliance pooling data from the four different treatments. The results of this additional 
analysis support the conclusions discussed in the main text. 
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 5.3. Other behavioral explanations: inequity aversion and guilt aversion 
So far we have considered explanations related to the existence of heterogeneity in norm compliance or in the under-
standing of what constitutes a norm. However, it is also possible that participants are motivated by other types of behavioral
considerations instead of (or in addition to) normative concerns. Here we consider two popular behavioral motives that may
have particular bite in the context of our dictator games. 
First, distributional preferences may play a role, especially because our Peer and NoPeer treatments are based on three-
person and two-person games respectively, and this affects the implications that choices have for the redistribution of pay-
offs across players. For example, when the recipient’s wealth is £3 in the NoPeer/Give treatment, there is no action by the
dictator that can equalize payoffs between the two players (dictator and recipient). However, when the recipient’s wealth
is £3 in the Peer/Give treatment, giving £3 to the recipient equalizes earnings between the dictator and the peer. Previous
studies have found that payoffs of third parties have strong inﬂuences on sharing behavior, even in settings where the payoff
of the third party is completely exogenous and cannot be affected by players’ decisions (e.g., McDonald et al., 2013 ). Thus,
payoff comparison considerations may explain some of the differences between the P eer and NoPeer treatments. 
In order to explore the extent to which payoff comparisons may explain our experimental results, we apply the Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion to our games. In this model, the decision-maker i ’s utility is given by: 
U i = πi −
αi 
n − 1 
∑ 
j  = i 
max 
{
π j − πi , 0 
}
− βi 
n − 1 
∑ 
j  = i 
max 
{
πi − π j , 0 
}
where π i is the player’s material payoff from the game and n is the number of players in the game (2 in NoPeer and 3
in Peer ). The parameter αi measures her aversion to disadvantageous payoff inequality, and the parameter β i measures her
aversion to advantageous payoff inequality. Fehr and Schmidt assume that β i ≤ αi and 0 ≤ β i < 1. 
Can the Fehr and Schmidt model explain the patterns of choices in the behavioral experiments? It turns out that the
model does not predict behavior in either of the treatments. In the No Peer treatment, the model predicts no relation be-
tween the recipient’s wealth and dictator’s giving. This is because in our games the dictator is always at least as well off
as the recipient, at all levels of the recipient’s wealth and for all the actions available to the dictator. This implies that the
model predicts that the dictator either gives nothing (if β i < 1/2) or gives £4 (if β i ≥ 1/2), regardless of the wealth of the
recipient. In contrast with this prediction, our data from the No Peer treatments show that dictators reduce their giving as
the recipient’s wealth increases. 
As for the Peer treatment, the Fehr and Schmidt model predicts that, if D 2 gives any money to the recipient (which
occurs when β i ≥ 2/3), the amount given is positively correlated with the peer’s giving. This is because, in the three-person
Peer games, D 2 compares her payoff not only with the recipient but also with the peer. Thus, because of disadvantageous
inequality aversion, D 2 is willing to give money to the recipient only to the extent that the peer also gives money, so that
her payoff does not fall behind the peer’s payoff. Our data do not support this prediction and show no relation between the
two dictators’ actions in the Peer treatment. 23 
A second potential motive that may play a role in our setting is guilt aversion (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006 ).
Guilt averse dictators suffer a disutility if they leave the recipient with less money than what the recipient expects to
receive. Guilt aversion may predict differences in behavior between our treatments because in the Peer treatments dictators
may adjust their beliefs about what the recipient expects to receive based on the giving of their peer. For instance, observing
that the peer gives £4 to the recipient may induce dictators to adjust their beliefs upwards as they may interpret the peer’s
actions as a signal that the peer thinks that the recipient expects £4 from a dictator. This signal is instead unavailable to
dictators in the NoPeer treatment. 
In order to test models of guilt aversion, one needs second-order beliefs of dictators about what recipients expect to re-
ceive. This is particularly important if one wishes to test whether these models are observationally different from models of
norm compliance (see, for example, Krupka et al., 2017 ). Because our design is already quite complex, we have not elicited
beliefs and so we cannot perform a formal test of guilt aversion as a potentially distinct explanation of our data. Neverthe-
less, if one plausibly assumes a positive correlation between dictators’ second-order beliefs and peer’s giving (along the lines
discussed above), then a positive relation between peer’s and dictator’s giving should emerge in the Peer treatments. At the
aggregate level our data do not support this prediction. In this sense, we think that guilt aversion is an unlikely explanation
of our behavioral results. 
6. Conclusion 
Our study shows that the behavior of others can have important effects on the way individuals perceive what constitutes
socially appropriate behavior in a given situation. In our dictator game experiments, whether or not an action is viewed as23 This prediction hinges on the assumption that both the recipient and peer are part of the dictator’s reference group. However, the results in McDonald 
et al. (2013) suggest that whether third parties are part of one’s reference group may partly depend on self-serving considerations: in their ultimatum 
games responders’ minimum acceptable offers (MAO) decrease in the payoff paid to a passive third party. However, when the third party’s payoff is too 
low, responders disregard the comparison and their MAO are similar to those in a game without third parties. 
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 socially appropriate partly depends on the extent to which another dictator (the “peer”) is willing to take it. These strong
effects of peer behavior on norms do not translate, however, into corresponding effects in actual behavior in the aggregate.
In particular, we do not observe a positive correlation between the dictator’s and peer’s generosity in the treatment where
dictators receive information about peer behavior. Thus, generous peers do not breed more generosity, despite the strong
impact of peer behavior on the average social acceptability of generous and ungenerous behavior. 24 
We discuss a number of possible explanations for the discrepancies between normative considerations and actual behav-
ior observed in our experiments. We ﬁnd evidence of heterogeneity in normative views that is related to the presence of
peers: the peer’s behavior introduces normative cues that are in contrast with the notion of fair sharing that subjects seem
to hold when peers are absent (see McDonald et al., 2013 for related evidence). This conﬂict in normative views can explain
why we ﬁnd a large fraction of subjects unwilling to comply with the average view of appropriateness and why dictators fail
to follow the example of peers. Thus, our results suggest that the extent to which peers reinforce or counteract pre-existing
notions of appropriateness may be an important determinant of the strength of peer effects. 
Our results raise a number of interesting questions regarding the existing approaches to norm compliance (e.g., Krupka
and Weber, 2013 ). The current focus on normative consensus (the average or most frequent notion of what is appropriate)
may be limiting in contexts where there are conﬂicting normative views: understanding the interplay between heteroge-
neous norms and norm compliance seems crucial in order to explain behavior in such situations. 25 In this sense, the use of
within-subject experimental designs, where normative views and behavior are collected from the same subjects, may prove
a useful research tool for further research in this area, since they would allow to correlate at the individual level behavior
and beliefs about what constitutes a norm in a given situation. 26 
Another interesting question relates to the role of sanctions for norm compliance. Recent research has shown that indi-
viduals are willing to use direct and indirect punishment to enforce social norms at a cost to themselves even in one-shot
interaction with strangers, and this can help explain why norms are adhered to ( Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012; Balafoutas
et al., 2014 ). Punishment opportunities may also play a role in resolving norm heterogeneity, for instance if subjects are
willing to enforce only some of the conﬂicting normative views that are present in the population, but not others. In our
setting there was no possibility of norm enforcement and so we cannot test this hypothesis in our data, but this could be
an interesting avenue for further research. 
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